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Part III
New Strategies for Managing Retirement Risk

Chapter 9
Restructuring the Defined Benefit Pension
P. Brett Hammond and Douglas Fore
Funded defined benefit (DB) pension plans were a foundational pillar of
US private and public retirement security in the twentieth century. Their
appeal stemmed, in part, from the perspective that retirement promises
should rely on pooling saving, risk, uncertainty, and costs, with assets and
liabilities managed at the plan sponsor level. The appeal of company-
sponsored DB plans also flowed from the belief that any problems associ-
ated with a pooled, centralized approach could be managed and controlled
through sufficient regulation. Yet developments in the early twenty-first
century have precipitated the traditional DB model into serious decline.
Observers cite several reasons for this sea change, including higher worker
mobility, the maturing of DB plans in older and highly competitive manu-
facturing sectors with few new entrants, workers’ desire to control their own
saving, high rates of labor mobility,1 and the high costs of DB plan man-
agement, along with unexpectedly poor stock market performance and low
interest rates (Borzi, this volume).
In our view, the root cause of the decline of the DB model is broader,
since we argue that it is the unintended consequence of the risk-manage-
ment mechanisms adopted to reduce risk, correct agency problems, and
address pension administrative concerns. In this chapter, we offer a brief
overview of the problems that are tying DB plans into knots, including
principal–agent issues, regulation, accounting, and economic fallacies.
Next, we outline steps that could be taken to help employers meet the
goals and promises originally offered to workers in these plans. These
include consideration of economics-based approaches to analyzing fund-
ing adequacies, changes in accounting rules, curtailing option and interest-
rate arbitrage features, and strengthening the DB system insurer, among
other measures. Finally, we turn to the task of creating a new DB structure
attractive to employers, workers, and regulators alike—one that might offer
a resilient model for the twenty-first century.
The DB Challenge: A Principal–Agent Problem
At the heart of the DB issue is a simple but seemingly intractable conflict
arising from the so-called ‘agency problem’ in economics. This refers to the
fact that multiple actors involved in providing, regulating, supervising, and
paying out DB plans may come into conflict, such that their motivations
and distinctions may become muddled, driving a wedge between pension
participants and those acting on their behalf. This lack of transparency can
lead to conflict, introduce new uncertainty, increase risk, and raise costs,
even though the intent was quite the opposite. Such problems arise from
conflicts between different sets of well-meaning controllers adopted by
multiple agents who seek to protect the principals.
This conflict stems from a conflict of interest between the plan sponsor
and the employees in a firm offering pension. The economic model of
deferred compensation posits that workers will forgo current earnings if
they are offered a future pension from the employer. In turn, the employer
is responsible for making good on this promise, long into the future. A key
problem is that once workers retire, they are of little use to the firm (except
in convincing current workers that they will be ‘taken care of’ when they are
old); this raises enforceability questions. Moreover, no one knows how
current employer actions might affect the financial security of the sponsor-
ing company and its retirees into the long-distant future. The result is that
employers face mixed incentives to protect retirees.
This conundrum gives rise to a justification for pension regulation.
Ostensibly, regulation is adopted to protect the covered employee; US
examples include the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), the establishment of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), and related pension laws (Sass 1997). Nevertheless, the impact of
regulation has at times undermined that protection. In particular, regula-
tory confusion and dysfunction has driven up pension costs due to frag-
mented and competing regulatory responsibilities, and prompted some
plan termination. Many analysts agree that ERISA-compliance costs have
had the unintended effect of causing employers to shift away from DB
plans; in fact, Perun and Steuerle (2000) point out that one new and
far-reaching legal requirement has been added to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) code regulating pension plans each year since 1974, greatly
raising compliance costs.2
The sudden increase in DB plan terminations for reversion in the early
1980s also had a major impact on the way DB plan risk was perceived and
managed. Initially, DB plans terminated only when their parent firm filed
for bankruptcy; in the early 1980s, however, a new tax policy permitted plan
sponsors to terminate the plans under circumstances other than financial
distress of the plan sponsor. This change introduced substantial new un-
certainty into the long-term pension arrangement. Indeed, a wave of ter-
minations was initiated by corporate takeovers, where the acquirer
interested in an overfunded DB plan would unilaterally terminate the
plan and run the surplus assets through the income statement. Often the
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acquirer would immediately create a new DB plan, making the process
appear to be a straightforward violation of tax law, since plan sponsors are
not permitted to appropriate assets from the plan. Nevertheless, the IRS
allowed the transaction (Ippolito 2003). Not long thereafter, the Congress
reacted by imposing a reversion tax which eventually reached a confiscatory
50 percent, sharply reducing corporate incentives to maintain excess assets
in the plan. This episode also led to sponsors’ efforts to substitute cash
balance or DC plans in place of traditional DB plans.
These trends would logically have prompted workers still covered by a
DB plan to lose faith that their remaining plans would survive. That is, it
would be rational for workers to become leery of deferring further com-
pensation unless it appeared to offer an extraordinary rate of return,
particularly young workers likely to discount heavily the probability of
accruing full pension rights in an unchanged plan. This would have also
been true for longer-tenured workers caught up in the waves of downsizing
and plan conversions of the past twenty years.
The cumulative effect of reversions, defunding, and conversions has
eroded the trust that is the basis for deferred compensation—the basis
for the DB pension contract. As a result, a kind of ‘lemons market’ has
developed: many of the agents charged with protecting pension partici-
pants have faced increasingly conflictive incentives and mixed mandates.
While this problem crept into the system over time, it took on much greater
salience recently, given the coincidence of historically low interest rates
and negative equity returns. These were compounded by problems in the
government’s pension insurance system, and changes in accounting rules.
To these we turn next.
Problems in Pension Insurance
Regulatory efforts to control the most important risks faced by individuals
and employers in the DB environment have often had counterproductive
impacts, which ignore the underlying economics and further undermine
the system. One striking manifestation of this problem concerns the
national DB plan insurance program, the PBGC.
The PBGC was initially established under ERISA to protect workers with
DB plans against employer pension defaults. Nonetheless, it is widely
perceived today that the agency itself has become part of the problem:
the aggregate funding deficit for private sector DB plans has been in the
hundreds of billions of dollars for several years and it is expected to grow
further (Credit Suisse First Boston 2005; Morgan Stanley 2003). As an
involuntary unsecured creditor, the PBGC has swung from an asset–liability
surplus of $7 billion in 2001 to a deficit of $23 billion in its reported 2004
results—a swing of $30 billion in just three years (PBGC 2004). In addition,
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the insurer reports exposure of $100 billion to firms rated below invest-
ment grade (BIG) by the rating agencies; the latter estimate total
underfunding in the DB system to be $450 billion. Finally, the PBGC’s
deficit is expected to grow in the near term as a number of large plans
concentrated in troubled legacy industries experiencing global competi-
tion are expected to have further plan terminations.
Many observers of the system do not believe that, under current law, the
PBGC can return to surplus (CFFI 2004). Even the US Government
Accountability Office (USGAO 2005) has concluded that current funding
rules create a potentially large financial risk to the PBGC and consequently
to retirement income security. Interestingly, the PBGC is not subject to the
reserve and capital standards of the privately regulated insurance industry,
which allows it to continue operating under conditions that would result in
insolvency if the agency were a private insurer.
Several factors make it administratively difficult for the PBGC to oversee
individual DB plans. One is that funding rules permitting plan sponsors to
follow the ‘letter of the law’ while avoiding fully funding their plans.
Another is the use of a current liability minimum funding standard that
ignores significant changes in payout assumptions that are triggered if a
plan terminates. Other factors include credits from past overfunding,
waivers from required contributions, and the inability to enforce funding
rules (see Chapter 11) leading to poor funding when plans are taken over
by the PBGC.
Also important is the role of outdated information. By the time an
underfunded terminated plan arrives at the PBGC, the plan’s informa-
tional report filed with the government (the 5500 Form) is approximately
two years old. In other words, firms can often report their plans as finan-
cially healthy on the Form 5500, but at termination shortly, they can be in
much worse shape. For instance, Bethlehem Steel and United Airlines
reported their plans as over 80 percent funded on an ongoing basis, but
when they handed the terminated plans over to the PBGC, the plans has
less than 50 percent of the assets required to cover promised benefits.
Another structural problem is that pension insurance premiums have
been insufficient to pay for past losses and expected future claims; indeed,
many have argued there should be closer links between premiums charged
and the actuarially fair value of the insurance. Traditionally, premiums
have not varied across firms despite widely varying expected risk of sponsor
failure. A recent examination of the credit history of 27 of the largest PBGC
claims found that none had been rated investment grade within 3 years of
plan termination, and nearly 90 percent were rated below investment grade
up to 10 years prior to plan termination. Recent proposals suggest raising
premiums and adjusting future premiums according to the sponsor’s
credit rating (Warshawsky et al., this volume). Whether these are actuarially
fair prices for PBGC insurance remains to be determined.
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Accounting Regulation and Pension Valuation
Another manifestation of principal–agent problems in the DB pension
arena is due to the complicated nexus of accounting rules. Appropriately,
the theoretical goal in this area is to limit discretion, enhance transparency,
and engender consistency for the benefit of shareholders, workers, man-
agers, and regulators. In the DB context, the reality is that plans have very
long time horizons, both with regard to the accumulation and to the
payout phases. Employers sponsoring DB plans are responsible not only
for providing sufficient cash flows to meet current service and interest
contributions, but also obligations at far distant points in time. As a conse-
quence, actuarial projections for funding purposes must be made over long
time horizons involving such factors as future mortality experience and
assumptions regarding asset returns.
The reality of pension accounting, however, is that the accounting rules
themselves have been a source of DB dysfunction; both alone and in
combination with other forms of regulation. Specifically, problems arise
in conjunction with accounting rules that call for the use of single summary
numbers for liabilities, assets, returns, and discount rates. This issue goes a
long way to explaining why the equity share in pension portfolios has
remained high over several decades, despite changes that should arguably
have encouraged a shift to fixed income investment to better match
changes in the liability structure (particularly demographic aging). These
rules produced a situation where pension returns were decoupled from
pension risks.
Liability Accounting. From 1986 through 2005, the prevailing US standard
for pension accounting was the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) rule known as SFAS 87, which embodied a smoothing
methodology to dampen fluctuations in pension assets and liabilities
from one year to the next. Under this rule, pension liabilities were
treated as fixed-income instruments and discounted at a specified long-
term interest rate. Many rules govern permissible actuarial assumptions
when measuring a plan’s accumulated liabilities; however, the discount
rate used to measure plan liabilities never depended on the plan’s actual
demographic structure. Thus the rules insisted that the proper discount
rate was invariant to expected cash flows actually payable by DB plan
sponsors. For example, in the case of an old-line industrial firm with
many workers nearing retirement age, the DB plan would face the
prospect of having to pay out large sums to these workers as they began
to retire in large numbers. Finance experts would have recommended that
plan liabilities in this case be discounted with a yield curve of interest rates
matching the timing of required cash flows (US Treasury Department
2005). Nevertheless, SFAS 87 required a single interest rate unrelated to
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the place on the yield curve that a plan sponsor might need to discount
benefit payments using finance methodology.
When assessing changes in liabilities, SFAS 87 also required the use of a
standardized measurement approach including the projected unit credit
method (PUC), the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO), and the pro-
jected benefit obligation (PBO).3 The main problem with this approach is
that it produces deterministic values to set the pension obligation, depend-
ing on the regulatory goal. However, in addition to the many technical
choices that can limit measurement reliability, none of these measures
envisions variability of liabilities. In other words, choosing any of these
numbers is like buying a bond without knowing its duration. Just as a
bond’s duration affects its behavior (and hence its price), so too can the
duration of the liabilities affect behavior and valuation.
In 2003, the FASB released Exposure Draft Statement 132, which in-
cluded draft requirements helpful in formulating duration-like assess-
ments of a firm’s liability structure and the magnitude of cash flows
payable over time. These and other duration-related disclosures could
help those seeking to conduct sensitivity analysis and test key assumptions
about the firm’s asset management strategies and stress-test the firm’s
liability immunization strategy. Unfortunately, FASB rejected these poten-
tially helpful requirements.
Asset Accounting. Similar concerns may be raised regarding asset
accounting: thus under previous versions of SFAS 87 and 132 (in effect
from 1986 to 2003), a single rate of return assumption was used for
accounting for plan assets, and returns were smoothed over a period of
years. This had the very powerful effect of making actual volatility virtually
unrelated to the rate of return assumption selected by the plan sponsor.
Further, during that period, plan sponsors were not required to disclose
volatility assumptions for asset returns. As a result, the accounting rules
embedded a strong proequity bias; some argue that pension assets were
managed with such a ‘tilt’ that it appeared as if they had a beta of zero in
financial terms (Gold 2001).
Instead of requiring disclosure of the expected rate of return by individ-
ual asset category, the revised SFAS 132 requires only a narrative descrip-
tion of the investment strategies employed by the DB plans and the basis
used to determine the overall expected rate of return. The FASB did
require that the disclosure explain the general approach taken, which
data were used in forming the long-term rate of return assumption, or
whether or not adjustments were made to historical data. These disclosures
still allow assumptions to vary significantly from one plan sponsor to the
next. Also, anticipated returns can be booked on the income statement
today, but the risks can be smoothed on the balance sheet over a period of
several years (Gold 2001). This has led some plans to raise anticipated
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return assumptions and further boost the share of the portfolio devoted to
equities. Such behavior may be reinforced by internal company dynamics
that provide incentives for a CFO to avoid reallocating out of equities (Fore
2005). In the post-2000 period, as the equity bubble burst and analysts
undertook more detailed examinations of balance sheets (Coronado and
Sharpe 2003), this smoothing strategy was recognized as problematic. In
particular, the smoothing strategy was found to have a built-in negative
reinforcement mechanism, so that DB plans which appeared comfortably
overfunded in 1999, became dramatically underfunded by 2002. These
continue to be underfunded in 2005, and they now face the prospect of
many years of deficit-reduction contributions.
The principal–agent problem for DB pensions has resulted in a less-than-
full embrace of some key economic and statistical lessons that, when ignored,
can lead to some of the pathologies outlined earlier. The most important of
these is the inability of pension regulation to promote or even acknowledge
the benefit of dynamic, stochastic, and shortfall analysis rather than deter-
ministic and point estimates. The effect is to create incentives for companies
and regulators alike to ignore factors that can severely undermine the DB
pension and have led to the tenuous situation it is in today.
Prospects for Reform
Next we evaluate whether some relatively simple regulatory and legislative
changes could enhance the DB plan regulatory environment, so as to
prevent further erosion of DB plans to improve future funding. Our analysis
of potential remedies appears in Table 9-1, which arrays these along two
Table 9-1 Opportunities for Pension Reform
Easy Difficult
Incremental Credits Discount rates
Remove pension call option
Reform Exp. rate of return on
plan assets
Form 5500 timing/
transparency
Reversion tax reform
Fundamental
reform
Interest rate arbitrage Smoothing new income statement
Fair market valuation of assets and
liabilities
Agree on transition period to new
paradigm
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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dimensions: the degree of reform proposed (from incremental to funda-
mental) and the ease of realizing the reform (from ‘easy’ to ‘difficult’).
Many of these reforms would be true improvements, in our view.
The DB pension problem has attracted comparisons to the US savings
and loan debacle of the late 1980s, although the scale of pension write-
downs is unlikely to be as large in real terms. Under the status quo, the
reality is that DB pension beneficiaries will suffer in the form of reduced
benefit checks. Going forward, different options would address the pen-
sion funding gap through regulatory reorientation; for instance, measures
might involve adopting economic and statistical methods to valuing pen-
sion funding, boosting PBGC premiums, restricting lump-sum payments,
better capitalizing the PBGC, and reforming its premium structure. As we
shall show, some of these measures would have long-term impacts, while
others would have more immediate effects. Whether these would be suffi-
cient to save the DB pension system is not clear.
Insights from Financial Economics. To better understand the pension
funding problem, the first step would be to properly value a DB plan’s
liabilities, by treating them as future cash flows. That is, the financial view of
a DB plan’s liability is the expected present value of all cash flows the plan
commits to pay, inclusive of benefits associated with past and future service
of current and future employees, accrued to their expected retirement
dates. Furthermore, these cash flows would be discounted using a rate
consistent with the market-related risk of the liabilities, rather than the
more traditional expected return on the assets used to defease them.
A financial assessment of actual DB plan liabilities would view the liabil-
ities as representing a bundle of exposures to various market risk factors,
plus an idiosyncratic stochastic risk term unrelated to market factors (Scott
2002). Accordingly, the appropriate discount rates would be based on a
permanent set of standard ‘benchmark’ securities matched to the date on
the yield curve of the cash flows payable.4 A financial economics perspec-
tive would also propose more transparency in measuring DB plan assets.
Currently, DB plan assets must be (mostly) marked to market as of the
plan’s reporting date, but Form 5500 documents still allow substantial time
lags.5 Further, DB plans are permitted to ‘smooth’ the value of their assets
over several years. The financial economics approach would prefer fre-
quent market-updating of asset values, and little or no smoothing.
Adopting a financial economics perspective would likely prompt the
adoption of many new tools in the DB environment. These could include
dynamic asset allocation, shortfall risk, stochastic valuation, and the use of
nontraditional financial instruments (such as inflation bonds and options).
Dynamic asset allocation involves a class of models introduced to alleviate
the funding and opacity problems traditionally associated with DB pensions
(Guillen et al. 2004). The approach has been used in Denmark, where
174 P. Brett Hammond and Douglas Fore
returns-smoothing functions solely as an accounting device, and the pen-
sion contract, in finance terms, is modeled as a path-dependent contingent
claim combining elements of both DB plans and DC plans. Recently,
dynamic portfolio optimization models of asset–liability management
have been proposed which incorporate options to minimize the probability
of funding shortfalls. Results by Boender et al. (1997) suggest that pension
funds can achieve significant risk-neutral reductions in contribution rates
by implementing a liability-driven path-dependent put strategy. Neverthe-
less, few US DB plan sponsors or consultants have used this tactic as yet.
The use of shortfall risk (cf. Leibowitz et al. 1994) and stochastic models
(Boulier et al. 1995; Haberman and Owadally 2001) for analyzing and
managing DB pensions are well known but not particularly widely adopted.
One interesting fact is that stochastic control models imply nonlinear
contribution rates and asset allocation patterns. Thus when a plan’s fund-
ing ratio is low, contributions should be maximized and the asset allocation
tilted in favor of riskier assets. As the funding ratio improves, the models
predict that contribution rates and the allocation to risky assets be dialed
back. Finally, if the plan’s funding ratio exceeds 100 percent, contributions
can be suspended and gains locked in.
Perhaps the central insight offered by stochastic control models is that
spreading volatile gains and losses over shorter periods and recognizing
them faster leads to better funding (Dufresne 1989; Haberman and Owad-
ally 2001). Contribution rate stability and fund security cannot be traded
off over longer spreading periods. Further, these models imply that there
may be a minimum funding level (higher than some may suspect), below
which the plans cannot return to stable equilibrium.6 One limitation to
implementing stochastic models has to do with ‘transition effects’—that is,
a sponsor adopting this approach might face substantial up-front costs. For
example, the expected present value of benefits using the stochastic frame-
work can rise by one-third, as compared to traditional valuation methods
(Sherris 1995).7
Along with better statistical tools for pension valuation, moving to a
financial economics-based perspective on DB pensions could also spur
investments in new assets. Most retirees default into joint and survivor
annuities, so that plan sponsors and asset managers must begin thinking
about how to design an immunization strategy matched against both nom-
inal wage growth and beneficiary demographics.8 Currently, no sovereign
or high-grade private entity issues securities that match expected wage
trajectories of employees in a corporate or public sector DB plan. Accord-
ingly, Bodie (1995) has championed inflation-indexed treasury bonds,
arguing that these can be an essential component of the DB plan portfolio.
Of course if this asset were to constitute the entire DB plan portfolio, it
would imply high contribution rates and lower earnings for the plan
sponsor.
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Improving Accounting Rules. Earlier we have argued that the fundamental
principal–agent problem facing DB plans has been exacerbated by
accounting rules. Accordingly, several specific accounting changes could
help promote fairer valuation and immunization, while helping US and
international accounting standards converge. They would also curtail
sponsors’ opportunities to smooth/arbitrage pension assets and
liabilities, and take advantage of the pension ‘call option’.
The ultimate arbiter of accounting practice in the USA is the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). This entity could, for instance, an-
nounce that it would not allow the filing of financial statements with
pension assumptions that allow for arbitraging of assets and liabilities.
This would put a stop to cases such as at General Motors, where debt was
issued to the DB plan, but simultaneously a higher rate of return was
reported on plan assets.
Accounting standards could also be revised to prohibit credits from past
asset returns as a means of cutting current contributions, unless the plan
sponsor could demonstrate to a fiduciary that the credits represented real
assets. Indeed, the use of such credits is not currently seen with favor by
regulators (US Department of Treasury 2005). In addition, plan funding
could be treated in a more symmetrical fashion so that asset gains would
not automatically reduce the need for contributions, nor would asset losses
produce reversions or terminations. This would remove the firm’s pension
plan ‘call option’ while reconsidering the IRS rule on reversion taxes. The
intended consequence would be to place full responsibility for the current
plan firmly on the firm’s shoulders.9 In addition, if the call option could be
removed and the reversion tax problem solved, convergence could perhaps
lead to the Dutch approach to plan funding. In the Netherlands, DB plans
typically target funding levels between 115 and 135 percent of full funding;
as a consequence, there is no widespread DB funding problem in that
country. In our view, the most urgent change in accounting rules would
be to move to fair valuation of pensions. This trend is well under way in
Europe, launched by the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) issuance
of Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 17 in the year 2000. In a nutshell,
this approach moves toward the use of market prices to value assets and
liabilities, in lieu of smoothing techniques. It should be noted that adopt-
ing of fair value accounting forced sponsors to recognize the stochastic
nature of asset returns; that is, plan sponsors could no longer act as if
returns and risks were unrelated. To put it another way, plan sponsors
could no longer assume that equities had a financial beta of zero, and
pension gains and losses had to be immediately recognized. (By contrast, in
the USA, plan asset values can still be smoothed over a period of up to five
years.)10 Some argue that this introduces excessive volatility into sponsors’
financial statements, and that it has made accounting regulations drive
economic and financial decision-making. In response, the UK ASB noted
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that recognizing year-to-year fluctuations in asset values in the financial
statements was similar to recognizing revaluation gains and losses on fixed
corporate assets (ASB 2000: 71).
In addition to fair valuation, convergence of other pension accounting
rules in the international context would also be beneficial. For instance,
the US FASB has promised to the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) that it will work on convergence for retirement plan benefit
accounting. This project has proposed that actuarial gains and losses must
be recognized immediately, outside the income statement, in a statement
of total recognized income and expenses, and also included immediately in
retained earnings. In addition, indexation agreements and future salary
increases must now be taken into account when valuing liabilities (IAS
2004); plan sponsors and fund managers must also describe the assump-
tions and logic used to determine the overall expected rate of return on
assets as well as the expected rate of return for each major asset class.
Proponents of these new standards believe that moving to the more
transparent world of fair value accounting, and away from actuarial
smoothing of gains and losses, will prevent periodic funding crises by
highlighting small problems before they can grow into large problems.
Opponents of the new standards argue, conversely, that introducing fair
value accounting into a system of long-dated commitments introduces
excessive volatility for too little gain. Clearly an immediate move to fair
value accounting standards in the USA would have serious consequences,
given the large number of underfunded plans. On the other hand, having
the data to obtain a clear reading of troubled firms’ financial situation
would make clear that many intend to terminate their plans in the near
future.
Closing the Funding Gap. Restoring solvency to the DB system requires
closing the PBGC’s funding gap. One approach would boost premiums
paid by insured firms. One proposal would raise premiums by more than
half, index them to the growth in nominal earnings, and charge an
additional premium to firms rated BIG (McCall et al., this volume). This
approach would also give the PBGC’s Board, composed of the cabinet
secretaries from the departments of Commerce, Labor and Treasury, the
authority to adjust premiums in the future so that the PBGC could charge
actuarially fair prices for its insurance. This would be a revolutionary
development for the PBGC because it would significantly improve the
odds that future premium revenue could cover future expected losses.
Yet even if this occurs, it would not solve the so-called ‘legacy costs’
driving a wedge between PBGC assets and liabilities. These are attributable,
in part, to the fact that Bethlehem Steel, United Airlines, and many other
plan sponsors never paid for the full value of the pension insurance they
received and ‘put’ to the PBGC. Of course boosting premiums on healthy
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plan sponsors to cover past losses would likely produce more plan termin-
ations and, in the extreme, a collapse of the DB system. The reality, of
course, is that the PBGC is an undercapitalized insurance company with a
single line of business; its revenues consist of writing naked put options.
Reforms that would raise revenues in the same manner as previously does
not change the business model. Rather, the PBGC needs a new approach to
raising capital and bringing in new revenue. Another option might be to
‘socialize’ the PBGC’s past losses, by raising taxes on the current taxpayers,
or passing costs onto future generations by selling bonds. These choices
may not appeal to taxpayers who view with alarm increasing federal deficits
and social security shortfalls.
Reinventing the DB Plan
Up to this point, we have argued that critiques of the DB pension fall prey
to two problems. One is conceptual: well-meaning policymakers have too
often proposed piecemeal changes in the DB system, without taking the big
picture into account. The second problem is practical: while solutions may
be available, they are often expensive. For instance, financial economics
suggests that employers hold more fixed income in their DB portfolios and
contribute more. Reforms might also decouple the pension from the
income statement and balance sheet, which regulators might find difficult.
And reform might require an infusion of cash to capitalize the PBGC,
which again will be expensive. The odds against a comeback of traditional
DB plans are very long indeed.
Accordingly, in this section, we ask whether individuals, households and
employers might find appealing a new class of DB plan, one which would
hold onto the essential elements of DB retirement programs, while moving
away from other aspects. To make headway, we posit that the main goal of a
DB pension is to be a consumption-smoothing device,11 and we turn to the
consumption-based asset pricing literature (Cochrane 2005) to show that
forward-thinking individuals will seek assets that pay off well when times are
bad and hence most needed.12
Let us next consider the position of an individual DB plan participant.
The younger employee, recently vested in the plan, has accrued only a
small future benefit; as he is likely to exit the firm and the plan for
employment elsewhere, the DB promise is akin to BIG bonds in default.
In other words, the young employee will eventually receive, at retirement, a
small benefit comparable to a defaulted bond paying in recovery settle-
ment cents on the dollar. By contrast, the older and longer-tenured em-
ployee intending to remain with the firm until retirement has a DB promise
akin to an investment-grade corporate bond; he is likely to receive the full
face value of the bond in retirement, but there remains some chance of a
default (due either to employee or employer actions). Only at retirement
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will the full-career employee value the DB promise as akin to Treasury
bonds, as long as the plan is fully funded (and abstracting from PBGC
insurance ceilings and other problems).
The question, then, is how one might replicate the DB pension from the
point of view of the participant. One way would be to replicate the ‘pseudo
portfolio’ held by the participant with fixed-income instruments having the
same characteristics as the plan accrual pattern, embodying its separation
rates and eventual benefit levels. Rather than doing this with bonds dir-
ectly, we propose treating the promises as a series of credit option deriva-
tives, one for each year of potential employment. In the worker’s first year,
the probability of leaving employment would set the option value or price,
other elements of the design being equal. The second year’s pension
option value would be similar, except that it would be conditional on
remaining employed after the first year and the probability of leaving
employment might change. Each succeeding year would follow in like
fashion. This would be akin to a life insurance product where the payout
is unknown (the convexity of the benefit structure over time would also be
a factor).
A related approach would be consistent with Valdés-Prieto’s proposal
(this volume) to have companies (or governments) offer securitized Cov-
ered Wage Bill (CWB) bonds. He argues that in particular CWB bonds
would be good inflation hedges, as the wage bill should be highly correl-
ated with inflation at least in the medium term. He further argues for the
place of CWB bonds in a pension portfolio as a means to match the
participants’ human capital. Another technique would replicate the port-
folio by investing in a riskless asset and then in a second portfolio consisting
of risky assets; portfolio shares would vary within specified bands.
Toward a Portable DB Pension. One commonly cited drawback to DB
plans is the fact that workers lack portability. In most cases DB plans
evolved as distinct entities because sponsoring firms offered benefit
features suited to their business and to their workforces; sometimes
sponsors negotiated benefits with unions; and early retirement subsidies
were used to influence the age distribution of the staff at some firms. Plans
differ in their retirement ages, generosity factors, special disability rules,
and funding, all of which tend to make DB promises nonportable.
Yet lack of portability is not a necessary element of DB plans: for instance,
Blake (2000) notes that in the Netherlands DB plans are portable because
all plans share critical common features, including the use of the same
actuarial assumptions to value liabilities and accrued benefits. This means
that workers can transfer service credits when changing jobs and pension
plans. In our view, several plan design features would benefit from stand-
ardization, which would in turn foster portability, lower regulatory needs,
and cut compliance costs. Specifically, actuarial assumptions would be
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made uniform across plans, as well as a common benefit accrual formula.
Of course any particular benefit accrual rate could be set, though a rela-
tively low accrual rate could be more attractive since the plan becomes
more expensive to fund as the accrual rate rises. At the same time a plan
design where participants could purchase additional years of service credits
would presumably be a desirable feature. This is a not-uncommon feature
of state and local government DB plans, and is reportedly popular with
plan participants. Of course, as the accrual rate is ratcheted up, it would
become progressively more difficult for individuals to buy service credits.
Conversely, if the accrual rate were set too low, plan participants would only
receive adequate incomes in retirement if they purchased additional
credits. From a practical viewpoint, the only early retirement feature of
the plan would be to permit purchase of additional service credits, to
maintain actuarial and labor market neutrality.
In this type of portable DB plan, two workers having similar earnings
trajectories over their careers but different numbers of jobs would arrive at
retirement with identical retirement benefits. By contrast, in a traditional
DB plan, at retirement, job changers have much reduced benefits. A
portable DB plan therefore resembles the US social security system
(abstracting from social security’s spousal benefit and disability features;
disability insurance could be covered under separate insurance arrange-
ments and the plan could be neutral with regard to family status).
Standardizing assumptions generates a standardized DB plan, portable
across firms, industries, and occupations. If assumptions were suitably
standardized, different workers earning similar annual amounts participat-
ing in this plan with different employers (plan sponsors) would originate
similar liabilities in the plan and accrue the right to similar benefits from
the plan. If they were to terminate employment for whatever reason, their
accrued benefits would stay the same, as would the flow of liabilities their
participation in the plan had caused. It would also be necessary to stand-
ardize mortality assumptions. A standard population table with cohort
adjustments for expected improvements in longevity would likely be the
appropriate choice. Standardization of actuarial assumptions might not
necessarily extend to the full annuitization period, if some plan sponsors
wanted to offer pure life annuities while others would offer participating
provisions. One option would be to target a standard floor or base benefit
which could then be enhanced by plan sponsors as they saw fit.
While asset allocation patterns could be standardized via regulation, a
better approach might be to anticipate that reformed accounting rules
would produce certain common practice along with a healthy respect for
duration with regard to plan liabilities. An asset allocation approach we
find interesting would have an accumulation structure with two pillars. One
pillar would provide a guaranteed rate of return to participants plus the
possibility of additional accumulations, and while the second pillar would
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offer risky returns with no guarantee. The portion of the portfolio contain-
ing the riskless asset would have a variety of restrictions concerning the
investments that could be held, ensuring that the guaranteed rate of return
could be met or surpassed, and that other desirable features such as
immunization could be followed as investment strategy. The portfolio
share containing the risky asset would function as a percentage of the
overall DB plan and would be invested in equities. Each year, the plan
sponsor would be expected to contribute an amount equal to the plan
service cost in a predetermined ratio to the guaranteed asset percentage of
the plan and the risky asset percentage of the plan. These ratios could
change over time as a result of market performance, as could plan contri-
butions.
Possible Critiques. A potential criticism of the portable DB idea is that
benefit portability implies much higher eventual benefit payouts and
consequently much higher total plan liabilities. This, in turn, could imply
an unacceptably high plan sponsor contribution rate. There are several
ways to respond to such a criticism. First, benefit levels and plan liabilities
can be adjusted by offering a lower accrual rate. Second, young workers
who turn over subsidize higher-paid longer-tenure employees in the
traditional DB plan. It is difficult to justify this if policymakers are
concerned about security for all retirees. Third, it may be possible to
reduce costs by using better asset-management and asset–liability
matching models.13 Finally, this portable DB plan would be expected to
have much lower regulatory and compliance costs compared to traditional
DB plans. Separate portable DB plans for different groups could be
sponsored by professional associations, unions, insurance companies, or
other financial services companies.14
Conclusion
The traditional DB plan suffers from many problems, including well-
intended but misguided disciplinary and regulatory regimes. Here we
argue that a stochastic, more financially based approach to asset/liability
matching would enable DB plan sponsors to improve their ability to con-
sider expected risks in both liabilities and asset returns. Incentives can be
instituted to make plan funding more robust to changes in asset returns
and other vital economic and financial variables. With this, governments
will be asked to provide increased support for the needs of the pension
community. That is why we propose a new approach to the DB plan, an
approach preferable to piecemeal reform. It is a portable DB pension plan,
most likely to appeal to firms seeking to attract younger and more mobile
workers concerned with lifelong retirement security. It combines the best
of what DB and DC plans have to offer and in so doing, incorporates the
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key roles of pensions in retirement security. We anticipate that this model
can prove practical and attractive to interest a wide range of sponsors.
Endnotes
1. The decline of job tenure and the apparent changing nature of the employee–
employer relationship partly explains the shift away from DB pensions, since
securing long job tenure is less valuable than previously. There is little evidence
that employers offering DC plans value long-tenured employees (Friedberg and
Owyang 2004).
2. Of course, an additional consequence of ERISA and related regulations might be
a loss of innovation potential by the various actors involved in DB plan design
and management, as they have become increasingly bound in a regulatory and
compliance straitjacket.
3. Details and uses of these measures are widely known, as are specific issues with
each; see McGill et al. (2004).
4. Financially appropriate yield curve discounting raises plan liabilities for mature
plans with a large fraction of annuitants, as compared to current actuarial
practice. Yield curve discounting could also improve incentives for pension
immunization.
5. Along these lines it should be noted that private equity poses a particular
valuation problem, as it typically has a 7–10-year time horizon over which it is
not marked to market. Private equity is a rising share of pension plan portfolios.
6. Other uses of stochastic control include modeling the option value of early
retirement benefits (Chen 2002), and a spread method of funding assuming
changes in plan liabilities are random (Josa-Fombellida and Rincon-Zapatero
2004).
7. A stochastic differential equation seems to improve the accuracy of such ac-
cruals, but at a current cost for the sponsor (Bacinello 2000). Similarly, using a
partial differential equation, Taylor (2002) shows that a funding or solvency level
below 80 percent represented an unstable equilibrium, and funding tends to fall
even further.
8. At the individual level, workers who invest their annual retirement contributions
in a series of five-year insured products, perhaps based on inflation bonds, could
have a higher probability of meeting their retirement income targets than if they
were to invest the same amount in the S&P 500 index (Bodie and Crane 1999). A
participant would buy a series of these during the accumulation phase, and these
retirement income contracts could guarantee a monthly income for life in
retirement. In theory, these contracts could be designed to provide the best
features of both DC and DB plans, but in practice their transaction costs might
make them less attractive.
9. To avoid unintended consequences, however, such policies might require FASB
movement and action on a statement of comprehensive income so that firms also
face incentives to preserve pension over funding when asset totals are larger than
anticipated (i.e. so there will be assets held in a kind of reserve for when returns
are lower than anticipated). We are aware that FASB action on a new income
statement is a major reform and no simple task.
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10. Fair valuation of liabilities represents a challenge because of the pattern of
salary increases and recognition that the ‘true’ liability horizon is a worker’s life
expectancy. Acknowledging the lack of an active market in long pension liabil-
ities, the UK ASB considered alternative actuarial methods to unlink the dis-
count rate on liabilities from the expected return on plan assets. These
included the use of inflation bonds as the liability benchmark or a weighted
portfolio of equities and bonds. In the end, the ASB settled on a single discount
rate, the AA corporate bond, noting that part of the rationale for this decision
was to bring about convergence in standards.
11. The traditional DB pension also fulfilled labor market objectives such as en-
couraging employee loyalty in firms where the development and retention of
firm-specific human capital was a valuable management objective; these are
usually thought of as secondary objectives in the USA.
12. Most 401(k) plans do not do a good job of smoothing lifetime consumption for
their participants. For instance, 401(k) plans tend not to provide financial
planning guidance nor payout annuities, though most offer a wide menu of
investment fund choices, especially in the equity area.
13. Alternative asset allocation models could be constructed using contingent-
claims pricing techniques to replicate the benefit accrual paths of a standard-
ized, portable DB plan. The plan could be modeled using contingent-claims
techniques where the payoff function is a discrete event with a known maturity
date. For a large enough pool of participants, path-dependence in the contin-
gent claim can be handled via a sufficiently conservative investment strategy.
Termination from the plan can be expressed as a surrender option. In practice,
individuals will exit the plan due to death, disability, and withdrawal. Practical
actuarial work realizes this and constructs what are called multiple decrement
tables to model survival rates. Decrement models exist to handle mortality rates
at various ages, disability rates, and turnover; they also vary according to how
they model key variables.
14. Alternatively, such plans could be organized along loose lines of affiliation,
such as wage earners versus salary earners; the main supplemental public
pension schemes in France are structured in this way.
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